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Effects of top performer rewards on fellow salespeople: A double-edged sword 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Rewarding top performers is of strategic importance to the sales organization. Top performing 
salespeople not only contribute significantly to the success of their firm but may also motivate 
the skill development of peer salespeople. However, both academic research and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that top performer rewards can actually boomerang by damaging peer 
salespeople’s morale and productivity, although the underlying mechanisms and boundary 
conditions remain unclear. Using a sample of salespeople and their managers from financial 
investment firms in Taiwan, the authors uncover both positive and negative effects of top 
performer rewards. Specifically, it is found that when behavior control is employed, top 
performer rewards are positively associated with perceived top performer customer relationship 
building competence only when overall organizational justice is high. In contrast, when 
organizational justice is low and behavior control is employed, top performer rewards give rise 
to perceived favoritism. Moreover, in large sales units, top performer rewards are much less 
likely associated with perceived favoritism when organizational justice is high. It is through the 
perceived top performer customer relationship building competence and perceived favoritism 
that top performer rewards have a double-edged sword effect on fellow salespeople’s selling 
skills, opportunism, and sales performance. Theoretical and managerial implications are 
discussed. 
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opportunism; sales performance 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
For many firms, their sales force is the only organizational unit that generates sales 
revenues and profits (Miao and Evans 2013; Spiro and Weitz 1990). For these organizations, 
reward systems that recognize and differentiate top performing salespeople from average peers is 
of strategic importance because top performers (1) contribute significantly to the success of the 
sales organization (Abosch 2012) and (2) can impart valuable customer relationship building 
skills to peers (Ledingham, Kovac, and Simon 2006). While most companies consider top 
performer rewards as strategic investments (Buchanan 2002), some academic researchers have 
suggested that rewarding top performers can leave other employees demotivated and ready to 
quit (Pfeffer 2001; Zenger 1992). Anecdotal evidence seems to corroborate these academic 
insights as it is reported that only one third of such top performer-focused reward programs 
produced positive results, and about one third even produced negative results, on fellow 
employees’ morale and performance (Cowen 2016). In a similar vein, a Wall Street Journal 
article (Lehrer 2010) cautions that the so called “star effect” can actually make fellow employees 
unproductive and less likely to reach their best potential.  
While researchers have suggested that top performer rewards hold the potential for 
altering the behaviors of the observers (e.g., peer salespeople) that reflect either a hopeful or 
frustrated attitude toward expectancy of performance change (Cowherd and Levine 1992; 
Schnake and Dumler 1989), the literature is silent on the mechanisms and boundary conditions 
under which top performer rewards have the intended (positive) vis-à-vis unintended (negative) 
effects on fellow salespeople’s job-related outcomes. Therefore, the current study fills this 
research gap by explicitly investigating (1) the mechanisms through which top performer 
rewards have a positive vis-a-vis negative impact on peer salespeople’s behaviors and job-related 
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outcomes and (2) boundary conditions under which positive or negative outcomes of top 
performer rewards become particularly salient.   
Top performer rewards induce upward comparison made by peer salespeople, which may 
subsequently alter their expectations of performance change (Cowherd and Levine 1992); hence, 
expectancy theory (Evans, Margheim, and Schlacter 1982; Vroom 1964) offers valuable insight 
into the underlying mechanisms that contribute to optimistic or pessimistic reactions by peer 
salespeople. Our research model (Figure 1) suggests that although top performer rewards 
strengthen valence of rewards and instrumentality of superior performance, the extent to which 
top performer rewards produce positive or negative outcomes on fellow salespeople is expected 
to hinge on expectancy reinforcing (e.g., perceived top performer customer relationship building 
competence) or expectancy deflating (e.g., perceived  favoritism) mechanisms. In particular, 
when top performer rewards are construed as reflecting the top performer’s customer relationship 
building competence, peer salespeople may have a positive attitude that motivates them to 
improve their selling skills through peer-based learning, which subsequently enhances 
performance (Chan, Li, and Pierce 2014). Although salesperson competence can include many 
other aspects such as product knowledge and presentation skills, we focus on customer 
relationship building competence because of the pivotal role of customer relationship building in 
modern marketing exchange (Palmatier et al. 2006). In contrast, when top performer rewards are 
interpreted as a result of favoritism, peer salespeople may experience reward deprivation 
resulting in demotivation and subsequent opportunistic behavior (Cowherd and Levine 1992). 
Using a dyadic and multi-level dataset of salespeople and their managers from financial 
investment firms in Taiwan, we empirically test the research framework depicted in Figure 1, 
results of which provide strong support for most of the hypothesized relationships. We found 
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complex three-way cross-level interactive effects of top performer rewards and organizational as 
well as managerial factors resulting in either positive or negative outcomes on the part of fellow 
salespeople. Specifically, it is found that when behavior control is employed, top performer 
rewards are positively associated with perceived top performer customer relationship building 
competence only when overall organizational justice is high. In contrast, when organizational 
justice is low and behavior control is employed, top performer rewards give rise to perceived 
favoritism. Moreover, in large sales units, top performer rewards are much less likely associated 
with perceived favoritism when organizational justice is high. It is through salesperson 
perceptions that top performer rewards have indirect effects on their behaviors and sales 
performance: perceived top performer customer relationship building competence motivates 
salespeople to improve their selling skills by learning from the top performer (Chan, Li, and 
Pierce 2014), whereas perceived favoritism induces salesperson opportunistic behavior.  
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
This research makes three important contributions to the sales literature. First, it enriches 
the literature by uncovering the underlying mechanisms of the double-edged sword effects of top 
performer rewards, which has been suggested in prior research but never formally investigated. 
Second, this study also makes a theoretical contribution by illustrating some of the boundary 
conditions of expectancy theory that can either strengthen or weaken salespeople’s expectancy as 
a function of top performer rewards. Third, our research contributes to sales management 
practice in that it informs managers of the organizational/managerial factors that can facilitate 
the intended benefits of top performer rewards while keeping the unintended negative outcomes 
at bay, which results in significant consequences on the overall effectiveness and productivity of 
the sales organization (Pfeffer 2001; Schnake and Dumler 1989). 
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 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of relevant 
background literature, we develop detailed hypotheses regarding expected relationships in Figure 
1. We then describe our empirical research methods including sample and data collection 
procedures, measurement validation, data analysis techniques, and hypotheses testing results. We 
conclude the paper with a discussion of research and managerial implications, limitations of the 
current study, and directions for future research. 
Background literature  
Top performer rewards 
According to a recent report on salary surveys (Abosch 2012), virtually all U.S. 
organizations consider rewarding their top performing employees a key decision due to the 
demonstrated link between rewarding top performers and business success.  Most sales 
organizations recognize that top performers expect both tangible (e.g., financial compensation) 
and intangible (e.g., formal recognition) elements in their rewards as these dimensions bear 
particular importance to boundary-spanners relative to other employees (Arnold et al. 2009). As 
top performers in sales organizations typically climb to the top spot as a result of relationship 
building competence during customer visits and interactions (Gellerman 1990), top performer 
rewards serve to recognize, differentiate, and retain them as valuable organizational assets 
(Buchanan 2002).  
A less investigated phenomenon is the effect of top performer rewards on fellow 
salespeople. While some researchers suggest that top performers may help improve fellow 
salespeople’s skills and performance (Chan, Li, and Pierce 2014; Ledingham, Kovac, and Simon 
2006), others voice concerns over unintended negative consequences of top performer rewards in 
terms of peer employee motivation and behavioral reactions (Cowherd & Levine 1992; Pfeffer 
6 
 
2001; Zenger 1992).  Anecdotal evidence also suggests that rewarding top performers does not 
always motivate fellow salespeople to perform and that sometimes such reward systems may 
even have detrimental consequences by damaging peer morale and performance (Cowen 2016; 
Lehrer 2010). As no academic study has explicitly examined the underlying mechanisms as well 
as organizational and managerial conditions under which top performer rewards produce positive 
vis-à-vis negative effects on fellow salespeople’s job-related outcomes, an empirical 
investigation is warranted. 
Behavior control 
Sales organizations typically direct their sales force to attain desirable organizational 
objectives through sales control systems, which are defined as “an organization’s set of 
procedures for monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating its employees” (Anderson 
and Oliver 1987, p. 76). Sales control systems can be primarily outcome-based or behavior-
based, which reflects a continuum of control philosophy and style. When outcome control is 
employed, salespeople are held accountable for immediate sales results (e.g., sales volume) with 
very little management involvement in directing or monitoring the process of selling; conversely, 
behavior-based control is characterized by a high level of managerial involvement in directing 
and monitoring salesperson activities and/or strategies that management considers necessary in 
accomplishing desired sales objectives (Oliver and Anderson 1994).  
A main benefit of behavior control is the mechanism it affords managers in aligning 
salesperson behavior with organizational priorities. Under behavior control, the salesperson’s 
financial compensation and career development are largely dependent on fulfillment of required 
activities during the selling process, which motivates the salesperson to allocate time and effort 
accordingly (Anderson and Oliver 1987). For example, the company may be interested in 
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elevating attention on a particular new product, thereby requiring salespeople to devote a 
specified amount of effort (e.g., number of sales calls, number of samples distributed, and the 
kind of promotional materials provided to customers) on behalf of the new product as part of 
their distribution of selling effort (Ahearne et al. 2010). Similarly, under behavior control, the 
sales organization can require salespeople to spend more time qualifying new leads than 
servicing existing customers in order to expand the overall market share (Miao and Evans 2014). 
Given the alignment of salesperson behavior and organizational objectives, behavior control 
suggests an appropriate combination of behavioral strategies by which salespeople should 
organize and engage in their selling activities (Fang, Evans, and Landry 2005).  
Organizational justice 
Perceived organizational justice is a necessary condition for the effective functioning of a 
sales organization (DeConinck and Johnson 2009). Traditionally, organizational justice has been 
studied as a multi-dimensional construct including distributive justice, procedural justice, and 
interactional justice (Skarlicki and Folger 1997). While distributive justice is the perceived 
fairness of rewards allocation, procedural justice refers to the fairness of a company’s formal 
procedures that demonstrate consistency across employees. A third dimension of organizational 
justice is interactional justice, which focuses on the salesperson’s perception of the quality of the 
interpersonal treatment (e.g., respect and dignity) received during leader-member exchange.  
Recent advancement in organizational justice research has questioned the benefits of 
studying the independent effects of specific types of justice. Focusing on a specific type of 
justice (e.g., distributive justice) may fail to capture an individual’s overall justice judgment, 
which is a more appropriate variable when examining outcomes such as job performance and 
attitude toward one’s organization. In other words, overall justice is the proximal, whereas 
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specific types of justice the distal driver of outcomes (Ambrose and Schminke 2009). In 
particular, research evidence suggests that people typically form an overall organizational justice 
judgment and then use this heuristic device (as opposed to individual justice components) to 
guide their interpretations and responses to organizational events (Bobocel 2013). In other 
words, what ultimately drives an individual’s attitude and behavior is the gestalt of their overall 
sense of organizational justice, which carries important informational cues and can lead to 
positive or negative behavioral consequences irrespective of the individual’s own outcome 
favorability such as bonus earned for exceeding quota (Ambrose and Schminke 2009; Barclay, 
Skarlicki, and Pugh 2005).  
Conceptual model overview 
Our conceptual model draws on expectancy theory (Cron, Dubinsky, and Michaels 1988; 
Vroom 1964), which views the salesperson’s motivation as a function of three cognitive 
components related to a selling task: valence, instrumentality, and expectancy. Valence refers to 
the salesperson’s perceived desirability of receiving increased rewards as a result of improved 
performance; instrumentality is the perceived linkage between a particular level of performance 
outcome and corresponding rewards; expectancy reflects an individual’s estimate of the 
probability that expending a certain amount of effort on a task will lead to an improved level of 
performance.  
Consistent with expectancy theory, our model (Figure 1) suggests that top performer 
rewards (i.e., financial compensation and formal recognition) can elevate the salesperson’s 
perceived valence and instrumentality. However, the extent to which a salesperson will likely 
strive to improve his/her selling skills (i.e., expectancy) depends on whether the salesperson 
perceives top performer accomplishments to be a function of customer relationship building 
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competence vis-à-vis perceived favoritism. Moreover, the positive effects (i.e., through 
perceived customer relationship building competence) and the negative influences (i.e., via 
perceived favoritism) of top performer rewards are moderated by three organizational/managerial 
factors: behavior control, organizational justice, and unit size. It is in the presence of these 
boundary conditions that the double-edged sword effects of top performer rewards become 
particularly salient. We discuss expected relationships of model variables in the next section. 
Hypotheses development  
Effects of top performer rewards on salesperson perceptions  
 
While sales performance is a function of many factors, meta-analytic reviews (e.g., 
Churchill et al. 1985) suggest that salesperson skill is the most important antecedent of sales 
performance. Of a salesperson’s skill set, customer relationship building competence is a 
particularly relevant skill because of the strategic importance of cooperative partnerships 
between the seller and buyer in the modern relationship marketing era (Hunter and Perreault 
2007; Palmatier et al. 2006). Superior performance (e.g., large orders) is often the result of a 
strong relationship cultivated between the salesperson and the customer (Gellerman 1990). In 
fact, a strong salesperson-customer relationship not only directly improves salesperson 
performance, but also enhances customer loyalty toward the selling firm leading to higher 
customer share, price premium, and sales growth (Palmatier et al. 2007).  
Moreover, many sales organizations also define a new role for their top salespeople as 
collegial mentors such that what appears to be instinctual relationship-building skills can be 
imparted (Ledingham, Kovac, and Simon 2006). By observing first-hand the top performer’s 
customer-winning strategy and behavior, salespeople can strengthen the perceived link of 
customer relationship building competence and superior performance (i.e., expectancy 
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reinforcing), especially in a work environment where salespeople operate in close proximity 
(e.g., retailing) so interaction with and feedback from the top performer is likely (Chan, Li, and 
Pierce 2014). To the extent that top performer rewards reflect superior customer-driven sales 
performance, salespeople will perceive a positive relationship between top performer rewards 
and top performer customer relationship building competence.  
H1: There is a positive association of top performer rewards and perceived top performer 
customer relationship building competence. 
 
When the sales organization employs a high level of behavior control, however, the 
positive association of top performer rewards and perceived top performer customer relationship 
building competence will be weaker. Under behavior control, the sales organization prescribes a 
set of instrumental behavior-based requirements (e.g., following a predetermined procedure for 
handling customer objections) that salespeople must perform, as attainment of these behavioral 
goals is assumed to eventually lead to successful sales results (Miao and Evans 2013; Oliver and 
Anderson 1994). Although some required activities (e.g., prioritizing new customer visits over 
providing service to existing customers) may not be conducive to customer relationship building, 
in principle every salesperson (including the top performer) will have to perform the sales task in 
a similar fashion according to prescribed standard procedures and steps, because behavior 
control empowers the manager to guide and monitor the way salespeople carry out tasks (Oliver 
and Anderson 1994). Because performance evaluation under behavior control focuses on the 
salesperson’s inputs (e.g., activities) as opposed to immediate outputs (e.g., sales volume) during 
the selling process (Oliver and Anderson 1995), efficiency in carrying out required activities 
becomes particularly important. That is, individual differences in customer relationship building 
competence become somewhat less impactful, as long as the “recipe” of selling is carried out 
efficiently.  
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H2a: Behavior control weakens the positive association of top performer rewards and 
perceived top performer customer relationship building competence. 
 
Academic research suggests that companies have a general tendency to treat top 
performers’ deviant behavior more leniently (Bellizzi and Bristol 2005). Because top performers 
interact more frequently with the manager and typically have a closer relationship with the top 
management (Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 2010), the sales force at large may perceive that top 
performers have gained an unfair advantage from these favored relationships otherwise not 
available to the rank and file, whether or not perceived favoritism actually has occurred 
(Henderson 2001). Anecdotal evidence also indicates that it is not uncommon that managers 
demonstrate favoritism toward their top salesperson over fellow salespeople (Offenberger 2016).  
The positive association of top performer rewards and perceived favoritism may be especially 
strong when behavior control is employed. This is because behavior control gives rise to 
potentially biased managerial discretion in the selling process (e.g., rule bending) or resource 
allocation decisions (e.g., better customers) favoring the top performer (Ahearne et al. 2010; 
Offenberger 2016), which may have a detrimental effect on the salesperson’s (non-top 
performer) future expectancy. While certainly perceived favoritism may not be reflected in 
reality, individuals will “ultimately act in accordance with inferences made” (Teas and McElroy 
1986, p.76). As such, we expect a positive association of top performer rewards and perceived 
favoritism, which becomes stronger when there is a high level of behavior control.  
H2b: There is a positive association of top performer rewards and perceived favoritism. 
H2c: When behavior control is employed, the positive association of top performer 
rewards and perceived favoritism is stronger. 
 
Most sales organizations employ some degree of behavior control (Miao and Evans 2013; 
Oliver and Anderson 1994); hence, a relevant question is under what conditions can the 
detrimental effects of behavior control be suppressed? We believe that organizational justice 
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research provides important insight into how salespeople perceive their work environment, 
which, in turn, will influence their beliefs about rewards and overall expectancy within the 
organization (Tyagi 1982). Behavior control is typified by a high level of standardized selling 
activities under frequent supervisor monitoring, direction, and intervention resulting in sales 
organizations obtaining a great deal of discretion in terms of input decision (e.g., resource 
allocation) and subjective performance evaluation (Oliver and Anderson 1994); however, it is 
this subjective characteristic of behavioral control that may give rise to either real or perceived  
preferential treatment toward top performers (Offenberger 2016). As such, salespeople may have 
drastically different interpretations of the nature and role of the behavior control within their 
sales organizations, which can subsequently alter their behavioral responses. Within the context 
of this study, we expect that when there are high levels of overall organizational justice, 
salespeople will tend to trust management to implement behavior control fairly and consistently 
across all employees (including the top performers). Should this be the case, we conjecture there 
will be less concern that the top performers have been provided unfair advantages (e.g., better 
sales territories). Moreover, it is anticipated that top performers will be evaluated by the same 
criteria used for assessing other salespeople (e.g., no rule bending when performing required 
selling activities). Consequently, when overall organizational justice is high, we anticipate that 
the standardized nature (i.e., same requirements and procedures) of behavior control can become 
a dominant feature providing a fair evaluation platform. When organizational justice is low, 
however, concerns over the subjective and discretionary nature of behavior control loom large, 
which fuels suspicion that the top performer may be provided an unfair advantage over peer 
salespeople.  In such instances, procedural or interactional justice is believed to be violated, 
regardless of the salesperson’s own outcome favorability (Aquino, Tripp, and Bies 2006; 
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Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh 2005).  As such, we hypothesize that organizational justice can alter 
the perceived nature of behavior control and its moderation effects in the following fashion: 
H3a: There is a three-way interaction among top performer rewards, behavior control, and 
overall organizational justice such that only when organizational justice is low will 
behavior control significantly weaken the positive association of top performer rewards 
and perceived top performer customer relationship building competence. 
 
H3b: There is a three-way interaction among top performer rewards, behavior control, and 
overall organizational justice such that only when organizational justice is low will 
behavior control significantly strengthen the positive relationship of top performer 
rewards and perceived favoritism. 
 
Sales unit size is another boundary condition in our model, because research has shown 
that unit size provides important contextual information for decision making (Desai 2015), 
impacts inferences made (Green and Peloza 2014), and alters the attributional process (Huber, 
Podsakoff, and Todor 1986), all of which can affect the salesperson’s expectancy in the context 
of this study. In instances where the sales unit is large, the sales role may be laden with more 
ambiguity and uncertainty especially in relation to what may have accounted for the top 
performer’s performance (Arnold et al. 2009).  
We suggest that the overall justice perception provides a pivotal mental shortcut through 
which inferences can be made (Bobocel 2013). On the one hand, a large sales unit typically has 
more intense intra-unit competition among salespeople, where a top performer may likely be 
considered even more competent in customer relationship building. Conversely, a large sales unit 
is also more likely to have uneven resource allocations (e.g., customer accounts of different 
quality or potential). Territory and customer difficulty may remain hard to determine at the 
individual salesperson level (Arnold et al. 2009).  This may result in large sales unit size giving 
rise to perceptions of unfair advantage for the top performer over others simply because of the 
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difficulty in being fully informed about how sales colleagues are presented opportunities and 
resources.  
Therefore, the extent to which salespeople will attribute the top performer’s rewards to 
competence versus favoritism can be affected by the relative size of the sales unit with larger 
units creating more opportunities for mixed messages in overall justice perceptions (Arnold et al. 
2009). When overall organizational justice is high, salespeople will have a higher level of 
confidence in the integrity of the sales-related decisions regarding the extent to which similar 
resource allocation decisions and procedural requirements are applied across the sales force. 
Consequently, in a large sales unit salespeople will more likely perceive top performer rewards 
as a function of superior customer relationship building competence given more intense intra-
unit competition. Conversely, when organizational justice is low, salespeople in a large sales unit 
are more likely to perceive unfair treatment in favor of the top performer due to greater potential 
variation in resource allocations and managerial discretion.  
H4: There is a three-way interaction among top performer rewards, sales unit size, and 
overall organizational justice such that when organizational justice is high, a large sales 
unit size (a) strengthens the positive association of top performer rewards and perceived 
top performer customer relationship building competence and (b) weakens the positive 
relationship of top performer rewards and perceived favoritism. 
 
Effects of salesperson perceptions on outcomes 
Perceived top performer customer relationship building competence and perceived 
favoritism can affect salespeople’s future expectancy beliefs in an opposite fashion, which 
ultimately result in considerably different behavioral responses (Johnston and Kim 1994; Teas 
and McElroy 1986). In particular, perceived top performer customer relationship building 
competence can motivate the salesperson to improve his/her selling skills. Research suggests that 
the top performer (i.e., peer expert) has a significant positive influence on fellow salespeople via 
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a role modeling process where salespeople will learn through the peer expert (Lam, Kraus, and 
Ahearne 2010). Similarly, in a retail setting, Chan, Li, and Pierce (2014) demonstrate that retail 
salespeople can effectively improve their selling abilities over time through observing and 
learning from the top performer in their work unit, thereby enhancing future expectancy of sales 
productivity. Importantly, such peer-based learning is effective not only for new salespeople but 
also for experienced salespeople when working with top sales performers (Chan, Li, and Pierce 
2014). Sales management in practice reinforces this argument where sales organizations are 
reported to encourage salespeople to develop/enhance their customer relationship building skills 
by observing firsthand how the high-performing salespeople worked (Ledingham, Kovac, and 
Simon).  Therefore, we expect a positive impact of perceived top performer customer 
relationship building competence on the salesperson’s selling skills.  
H5a: There is a positive association of perceived top performer customer relationship 
building competence and the salesperson’s selling skills. 
 
While we expect a positive relationship of perceived top performer customer relationship 
building competence and the salesperson’s selling skills, this positive effect will likely be 
weakened by a high level of behavior control. This is because under behavior control salespeople 
must follow a prescribed set of activities when fulfilling selling tasks, which can significantly 
diminish a salesperson’s ability to adapt to a variety of situations where different customer 
strategies or skills are appropriate (Ahearne et al. 2010). For example, under behavior control the 
salesperson may be required to sell a high profit margin product to new customers, when it is 
more appropriate to focus on other products in dealing with certain types of customers (Miao and 
Evans 2013). Consequently, while behavior control is otherwise well-intended, it can limit 
salespeople’s flexibility in practicing knowledge uniquely learned from and attributed to the top 
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performer during customer interactions, which can compromise the advancement of selling 
skills.  
H5b: The positive association of perceived top performer customer relationship building 
competence and the salesperson’s selling skills is weaker when there is a high level of 
behavior control. 
 
 The marketing literature has long established that selling skills are a pivotal precursor of 
salesperson performance (Pullins and Fine 2002; Sujan, Weitz, and Sujan 1988). In their seminal 
meta-analytic study, Churchill and colleagues (1985) found that selling skills are the most 
important determinant of the salesperson’s performance after accounting for individual 
demographic variables. More recent studies suggest that customer-directed selling skills such as 
closing sales are strongly related to the salesperson self-reported performance (Plouffe, Hulland, 
and Wachner 2009; Rentz et al. 2002). Therefore, salesperson’s selling skills are expected to 
have a positive effect on salesperson performance as evaluated by their managers. 
H6: Salesperson’s selling skills are positively associated with salesperson performance as 
evaluated by their manager. 
 
The boundary-spanning nature of the sales job can readily give rise to negative 
salesperson behavior because it is not uncommon for salespeople to misbehave as a reaction to 
perceived unfair organizational actions (Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh 2005; Choi, Dixon, and 
Jung 2004; Jelinek and Ahearne 2006). In particular, perceived favoritism dampens salesperson 
expectancies suggesting to the salesperson that perceived top performer customer relationship 
building competence may not be the main driver of performance and subsequent rewards. 
Instead, the top performer is perceived as potentially gaining an unfair advantage, which 
suggests an unevenness in the work environment and motivates the salesperson to “balance the 
scale” by engaging in opportunistic behavior such as “smoothing, focusing, and invalid data 
reporting” (Ramaswami and Singh 2003, p. 54)  
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Research in social psychology also illustrates that unfair treatment (e.g., perceived 
favoritism) may result in employees taking justice into their own hands by seeking revenge or 
trying to get even, which is likely fueled by outward-focused negative emotions such as anger 
(Aquino, Tripp, and Bies 2006; Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh 2005). Therefore, we expect 
perceived favoritism to increase salesperson opportunism. 
H7: Salesperson’s perceived favoritism received by the top performer is positively related 
to salesperson opportunism. 
 
Research methods 
Sample and data collection 
We collected dyadic and multi-level data from salespeople and their managers within the 
consumer sales divisions of financial investment firms in Taiwan. This empirical setting is 
appropriate because (1) all the salespeople work on site in the same branch as opposed to working 
in different territories outside the firm so peer-based learning is more likely and (2) salespeople 
are incentivized by commissions making it possible for a salesperson to expect a higher income 
should performance improve (i.e., future expectancy). After contacting over a dozen financial 
firms, a total of nine firms agreed to participate in this research. The original English survey was 
translated by two bilingual researchers following the conventional translation-back translation 
procedure to create the Chinese version for data collection (Brislin 1980).  
The surveys were distributed by one of the authors’ research assistants who brought 
questionnaire materials to the sales executives in person. Sales executives were given a research 
briefing before they delivered the survey materials to their sales managers. Sales managers then 
distributed survey materials to their salespeople, following a brief meeting with their sales 
executives. Sales managers were instructed to distribute the salesperson surveys to three 
salespeople they directly supervised (none of which was the top performer). Sales research 
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indicates that the top performer is typically widely recognized in the workplace so salespeople 
were not expected to have a problem identifying the top performer in their respective sales unit 
(Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 2010). Although there could be more than one top performer in the 
sales unit, the focus of this study is on the impact of that top performer’s rewards on the 
salesperson’s job-related outcomes without regard to who the top performer is.  
To encourage response rate, the nine sales executives were promised a copy of the research 
findings with managerial implications, and salespeople and sales managers were guaranteed 
anonymity. Moreover, no names were included on the surveys. Instead, surveys were coded in a 
way that permitted researchers to link salespeople to their managers upon completion of the data 
collection. A week after the distribution of the surveys, a follow-up call was made to each of the 
nine sales executives by research assistants. Two weeks after the distribution of surveys, research 
assistants collected completed questionnaires directly from the salespeople and their managers so 
salespeople’s responses would not be revealed to their sales managers. Because of the strong 
interest and endorsement of the sales executives, of the 83 sales managers and 249 salespeople 
who received surveys, we were able to match 71 completed surveys from sales managers (effective 
response rate of 86%) with 212 completed questionnaires from the salespeople (effective response 
rate of 85%). Roughly half of the responding salespeople were male (49.5%), and the average age 
of the salespeople was 35 years old with a mean fulltime sales experience of almost 7 years.  
Study measures 
Whenever possible, we adapted existing scales from the literature to operationalize 
variables in our study. All multi-item measures were anchored on a 7-point Likert scale. On the 
salesperson’s survey, top performer rewards (α=.76) was measured with two items that capture 
the salesperson’s perceived financial compensation and formal recognition the top performer 
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received (Arnold et al. 2009). Perceived top performer customer relationship building 
competence (α=.83) was measured with five items that are manifestations of the top performer’s 
customer relationship forging skills (Hunter and Perreault 2007). A three-item scale for 
perceived favoritism (α=.93) was developed for this study, which assessed the salesperson’s 
perception of the extent to which unfair advantage was given to the top performer in resource 
allocation (e.g., customer accounts assignment). Overall organizational justice (α=.73) was 
assessed with four items from Ambrose and Schminke (2009) that evaluate the salesperson’s 
general perception of how fairly the company treats its employees. We measured the 
salesperson’s selling skills (α=.92) with three items from Plouffe, Hulland, and Wachner (2009) 
that evaluate the salesperson’s ability to prospect and qualify leads as well as to close sales. 
Salesperson opportunism (α=.83) was assessed with four items adapted from Ramaswami and 
Singh (2003) that indicate the salesperson’s data “managing” effort in creating favorable 
impressions and evaluations. Sales managers provided data regarding behavior control, sales unit 
size, and salesperson performance evaluations. Specifically, behavior control (α=.71) was 
assessed with two items adapted from Cravens et al. (1993) tapping the extent to which the sales 
manager was actively involved in directing and monitoring salespeople’s activities during the 
selling process.  Salesperson performance (α=.92) was measured with three items adapted from 
Cravens et al. (1993) that assessed the salesperson’s contribution to sales revenues and profits. 
Moreover, managers reported sales unit size by providing the total number of salespeople 
working in the same unit. 
We also included three control variables–the salesperson’s own rewards, age, and 
fulltime sales experience–as these variables may affect the salesperson’s perceptions and/or 
performance (Churchill et al. 1985; Johnston and Kim 1994). Salesperson’s own rewards 
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(α=.86) was measured with two items adapted from Arnold et al. (2009) in terms of the 
salesperson’s own financial compensation and recognition received, and salesperson age and 
sales experience were each measured with a single item in number of years. 
Measurement model 
We assessed the psychometric properties of the multi-item constructs with confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) using EQS 6.1 software. The CFA model demonstrates an acceptable fit: 
χ2(314) = 558.79, p < .01; IFI = .94, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .06. All item loadings were large, 
positive and significant on their a priori constructs, demonstrating convergent validity (Anderson 
and Gerbing 1988). We next assessed discriminant validity in two ways. First, the average 
variance extracted (AVE) for each construct exceeds its squared correlation with all other 
constructs, suggesting discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Second, we also 
conducted Chi-square difference tests for all possible pairs of constructs comparing a one-factor 
model with a two-factor model. In all cases the two-factor model fit the data significantly better 
than the one-factor model (p < .01). Therefore, acceptable psychometric properties for all multi-
item constructs were established. In Table 1, we present the descriptive statistics of all study 
variables.  
-- Table 1 about here -- 
Because level-one data (with the exception of salesperson performance) all came from 
the same source–the salesperson, we tested potential common method variance (CMV) using two 
methods. First, we estimated a Harmon’s single factor where all items loaded on a single 
construct. This model had a much worse fit than our nine-factor measurement model (∆χ2(df=36) = 
2422.705, p < .01), suggesting there is no single common factor. Second, we included a common 
method factor on which all items loaded and re-estimated an overall measurement model. It was 
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found that trait variance (average 79.3%) significantly exceeds method variance (average 6.6%) 
and error variance (average 14.1%). The magnitude of average method variance is small and 
comparable with those reported in other similar studies (Carson 2007; Kim, Cavusgil, and 
Calantone 2006). Moreover, because our empirical test involves complex two-way and three-
way interactions, which cannot be artifacts of CMV (Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira 2010), we 
conclude that common method bias is not likely a serious concern in this study. 
Analytical strategy 
As mentioned earlier, data came from two levels: salespeople (level-one) and their 
managers (level-two). Salespeople within the same unit are nested under their manager. 
Therefore, the multi-level structure of the data lends itself to a two-level structural path model 
approach. We employed Mplus 7 for the simultaneous testing of all structural relationships 
depicted in our conceptual model, which is superior to other multi-level packages such as the 
HLM software which can only test one dependent variable at a time.  
We standardized all factor scores throughout the model before creating interactive terms 
(Hughes, Bon, and Rapp 2013). Because standard fit indices are not available in Mplus when 
estimating cross-level interactive effects, the deviance (-2 log-likelihood criterion) between the 
nested models is compared with a chi-square distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to 
the difference in the number of parameters between the two models. A significant Chi-square 
difference will indicate model fit improvement. 
Hypotheses testing results 
To test the hypotheses, a series of nested models were estimated (See Table 2). First, we 
estimated a baseline model that included only the main effects of level-one and level-two 
variables without entering the interactive effects (Model 1). Next, in Model 2, we entered 
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hypothesized two-way and three-way interactive terms. This hypothesized model demonstrated a 
substantial improvement over Model 1 with a significant Chi-square difference (p < .01). We 
report hypotheses testing results based on Model 2. Table 2 presents detailed hypothesis testing 
results. 
  -- Table 2 about here -- 
H1 predicts a positive relationship of top performer rewards and perceived top performer 
customer relationship building competence, which is supported (b=.42, p < .01). This main effect 
suggests that in general, salespeople consider top performer rewards as a function of superior 
competence in forging strong customer relationships. H2a, however, suggests that this positive 
effect is weakened when a high level of behavior control is employed. The cross-level interaction 
of behavior control (level-two) and top performer rewards (level-one) is indeed negative and 
significant (b=-.17, p < .05), in support of H2a. Top performer rewards have a positive yet non-
significant effect on perceived favoritism (b=.07, n.s.), which rejects H2b. The interaction of 
behavior control and top performer rewards on perceived favoritism is not significant (b=.01, 
n.s.); therefore, H2c is rejected. These two-way interactions are further influenced by the third 
variable–overall perceived organizational justice. As H3a predicts, overall perceived 
organizational justice, behavior control, and top performer rewards have a three-way interaction 
such that behavior control weakens the positive effect of top performer rewards on perceived 
customer relationship building competence only when overall organizational justice is low. It is 
found that the three-way interaction indeed has a positive effect (b=.09, p < .05), in support of 
H3a. Figure 2 (panel A) illustrates that, when salespeople perceive a low level of overall 
organizational justice (one standard deviation below the mean), the more behavior control is 
employed, the weaker the link of top performer rewards and perceived customer relationship 
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building competence. Conversely, when overall organizational justice is high (one standard 
deviation above the mean), the influence of behavior control is much weaker. H3b is also 
supported because the three-way interactive effect of top performer rewards, behavior control, 
and organizational justice on perceived favoritism is negative and significant (b=-.14, p < .05). 
As Figure 2 (panel B) indicates, under a high level of behavior control, top performer rewards 
will lead to perceived favoritism only when overall organizational justice is low; when overall 
organizational justice is high, top performer rewards actually lead to a lower level of perceived 
favoritism under a high level of behavior control. H4a is not supported as the three-way 
interactive effect on perceived customer relationship building competence of top performer 
rewards, sales unit size, and organizational justice is not significant (b=.05, n.s.). However, the 
three-way interactive effect on perceived favoritism is negative and significant (b=-.14, p < .01), 
in support of H4b. Figure 2 (panel C) suggests that under low overall organizational justice, high 
top performer rewards lead to higher perceived favoritism in large sales units; in contrast, under 
high overall organizational justice, high top performer rewards actually lead to lower perceived 
favoritism in large sales units.  
H5a is supported as perceived top performer customer relationship building competence 
has a positive effect on salesperson selling skills (b=.23, p < .01). The interactive effect of 
behavior control and perceived top performer customer relationship building competence on 
salesperson selling skills is negative and significant (b=-.12, p < .05), in support of H5b. As 
Figure 2 (panel D) illustrates, when there is a high level of behavior control, the positive 
association of perceived top performer customer relationship building competence and 
salesperson selling skills is much weaker. Salesperson selling skills have a positive effect on 
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manager-rated salesperson performance (b=.22, p < .01), and perceived favoritism has a positive 
effect on salesperson opportunism (b=.28, p < .01). Therefore, H6 and H7 are both supported.  
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
Finally, we tested relationships not hypothesized in the conceptual model (e.g., direct 
effect of top performer rewards on salesperson performance), one at a time in Model 3 (best 
fitting model as illustrated in Table 2). It was found that this model shows an improvement in fit 
compared to our hypothesized model (p < .01). Three additional significant paths were added: 
behavior control has a positive effect on salesperson opportunism (b=.10, p < .05), sales unit size 
has a negative effect on salesperson selling skills (b=-.06, p < .05), and overall organizational 
justice perception suppresses salesperson opportunism (b=-.35, p < .01). Importantly, with the 
additional paths, all but one (i.e., the path from overall organizational justice to perceived 
favoritism) of the significant relationships found in Model 2 remain statistically significant. As 
no direct path from top performer rewards is significant, the effects of top performer rewards on 
salesperson selling skills, opportunism, and sales performance appear to be indirect through the 
salesperson’s perceptions. 
Discussion 
Theoretical implications 
As sales organizations invest more financial resources and time on their strategic asset– 
the sales force–in the highly competitive marketplace, retaining top performers has taken on an 
increasingly pivotal role. Rewarding the top performer through attractive financial incentives and 
formal recognition is critical to the sales organization’s success (Buchanan 2002; Cowherd and 
Levine 1992), and the top performer is also expected to have a positive effect on fellow 
salespeople’s skills through peer-based learning (Chan, Li, and Pierce 2014; Ledingham, Kovac, 
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and Simon 2006). However, anecdotal evidence has indicated that rewarding the top performers 
does not always result in positive outcomes on fellow employees’ morale or performance and 
often can have contradictory implications (Cowen 2016; Lehrer 2010).  
Academic research suggests that top performer rewards may have unintended negative 
consequences on the health of the sales organization as peer salespeople may experience 
deprivation (Cowherd and Levine 1992) and become demotivated (Pfeffer 2001).  An 
understanding of how and when to utilize top performer rewards and their possible positive 
versus negative effects on peer salespeople, however, is still lacking. This study makes an 
important contribution to the literature by uncovering the underlying mechanisms as well as the 
boundary conditions responsible for the positive vis-à-vis negative effects of top performer 
rewards. By illustrating the contingent effects of top performer rewards on the salesperson’s 
perceptions (i.e., expectancy reinforcing or destroying), this study shows that top performer 
rewards are indeed a double-edged sword capable of producing both positive and negative 
consequences on the part of fellow salespeople.  
From a theoretical perspective, this study suggests that understanding the mechanisms 
through which the double-edged sword effects of top performer rewards operate requires 
consideration of the boundary conditions of expectancy theory. According to expectancy theory 
(Vroom 1964), a high level of top performer rewards can elevate fellow salespeople’s perceived 
valence and instrumentality of superior performance. However, top performer rewards will not 
always motivate salespeople to improve their selling skills (i.e., expectancy). Whether 
salespeople are motivated to improve their skills by learning from the top performer is still 
dependent on the extent to which salespeople consider top performers’ rewards as a function of 
customer relationship building competence. The perceived link of top performer rewards and 
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customer relationship building competence can have a reinforcing effect on the salesperson’s 
own future expectancy belief that improved skills will lead to better performance and handsome 
rewards.  
While it appears that there is generally a positive association of top performer rewards 
and perceived top performer customer relationship building competence, boundary conditions 
can affect the strength of this relationship. Most sales organizations employ behavior control to 
some degree because it affords managers the ability to direct and influence salespeople’s selling 
process in accordance with the sales organization’s goals and objectives (Anderson and Oliver 
1987). However, when the sales organization employs a high level of behavior control, we find 
that the positive association of top performer rewards and perceived top performer customer 
relationship building competence is much weaker. Under behavior control, salespeople carry out 
tasks by performing required selling activities and strategies that are deemed instrumental to 
meeting organizational objectives (Oliver and Anderson 1994). For example, the sales 
organization may require salespeople to allocate most of their time and effort on a high-profit 
new product, which may often distract from broader based need analysis and run counter to the 
principles of customer orientation and relationship building (Saxe and Weitz 1982). Therefore, 
under behavior control, efficiency in carrying out required activities may be more important than 
customer relationship building competence per se.  Moreover, because resource allocation and 
performance evaluations under behavior control are subjective in nature (Ahearne et al. 2010; 
Oliver and Anderson 1994), opportunities for the introduction of interpersonal biases such as 
favoritism are more prevalent (Bellizzi and Bristol 2005; Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 2010), which 
can dampen the salesperson’s future expectancy. Therefore, the perceived dominant nature of 
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behavior control (i.e., standardized behavioral requirements vs. subjective biases) will determine 
its moderation effects. 
Overall organizational justice becomes a critical environmental factor that can alter the 
salesperson’s expectancy when behavior control is employed. Overall justice perception is a 
function of salespeople’s global assessment of fairness in the sales organization, which is a 
heuristic cue used to judge events of potentially significant consequences (Bobocel 2013). In 
other words, overall justice judgment can shape salespeople’s cognitive perceptions of causal 
relationships, which, in turn, determine their attitudes and behaviors (Ambrose and Schminke 
2009; Bobocel 2013). When salespeople believe that the organization treats its employees fairly, 
an overall justice perception is formed, which enhances their confidence that the organization 
will treat them in the same fashion as that of a top performer. This belief significantly minimizes 
concerns of subjective biases in favor of the top performers under behavior control. For example, 
when the salesperson feels confident that the top performer is not selectively allocated top 
prospects (i.e., equal assignment playing field), a positive association of top performer rewards 
and perceived top performer customer relationship building competence will likely remain 
significant under behavior control. Indeed, our results suggest that only when overall justice is 
high will the detrimental moderation effect of behavior control be mitigated. In contrast, when 
overall justice is low and behavior control is employed, salespeople are much more likely to 
perceive top performer rewards as a result of perceived favoritism, as they may not be confident 
in the organization’s integrity in equally enforcing behavior control across salespeople.  
Similarly, when the sales unit is large (i.e., more salespeople), it becomes more difficult 
for the salesperson to observe and monitor a more expansive environment. On the one hand, in a 
large sales unit there is typically more intra-unit competition, which would corroborate the top 
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performer’s competence; on the other hand, a large sales unit also typically has more resources at 
its disposal, which can give rise to perceived favoritism in resource allocation and support 
decisions. As a result, the salesperson will likely rely on the overall justice perception as a 
heuristic shortcut to make inferences (Bobocel 2013). Indeed, our results suggest that only when 
overall organizational justice is high will top performer rewards be less likely associated with 
perceived favoritism in large sales units. 
Perceived top performer customer relationship building competence reinforces the 
salesperson’s expectancy that improved customer-directed skills will lead to consistently better 
future sales outcomes. This, in turn, will motivate peer-based learning as the salesperson actively 
learns from the top performer for skill improvement (Chan, Li, and Pierce 2014). Although skills 
and competence are relatively stable, they do evolve over time through learning by observation 
and doing (Ledingham, Kovac, and Simon 2006). Our results are consistent with the extant 
literature indicating that perceived top performer customer relationship building competence is 
positively related to salesperson selling skills, which subsequently leads to higher levels of sales 
performance. A caveat is that behavior control may hamper the peer-based learning process 
because it restricts the salesperson’s flexibility in adapting to customers’ divergent needs. For 
example, different customers need to be handled with different strategies when it comes to 
overcoming customer objections. The standard procedures required under behavior control 
would make it difficult for salespeople to effectively adapt to unique customer relational needs 
(Miao and Evans 2013), thereby impeding the flexibility necessary to practice skills acquired 
during peer-based learning from top performers.  
Perceived favoritism is expectancy damaging due to the presumed unfair advantage of the 
top performer over peers. It has been suggested that perceived unfairness in the workplace can 
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lead to employee deviant behavior or opportunism justified due to the presumed inequity 
(Ramaswami and Singh 2003). When salespeople suspect that work related unfair actions (e.g., 
perceived favoritism) have occurred, they can experience strong negative emotions such as anger 
toward the management, which can induce retaliation toward the organization (Barclay, 
Skarlicki, and Pugh 2005). As salespeople lose confidence in the organization’s procedural 
integrity in protecting their interests, they may desire to restore balance by engaging in active 
opportunism such as selectively presenting or distorting information reported.  Importantly, 
salespeople may react to perceived unfairness irrespective of the favorability of their own 
rewards (Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh 2005), which is corroborated by our results after 
accounting for salespeople’s own levels of rewards received. 
In summary, by integrating relevant boundary conditions into expectancy theory, this 
study demonstrates that top performer rewards are a double-edged sword capable of producing 
both positive and negative outcomes with respect to fellow salespeople’s behavior and 
performance. When the sales organization employs behavior control or when the sales unit size 
is large, overall organizational justice is a critical boundary condition to maximize the positive 
effects of top performer rewards while keeping deleterious effects at bay. 
Managerial implications 
As sales organizations strive to retain their top performers with attractive financial 
compensation and formal recognition, companies also believe that salespeople can improve their 
skills and performance by learning from top performers (Ledingham, Kovac, and Simon 2006). 
While we confirm the generally positive effect of top performer rewards on fellow salespeople’s 
skill improvement, our results also suggest that managers must be aware of the unintended 
negative consequences of top performer rewards that may likely be inflicted upon the sales 
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organization under certain conditions. Top performer rewards do not always deliver the intended 
message to the sales staff, especially when the organization employs a behavior control system in 
which the manager actively directs, monitors, and evaluates salespeople’s required selling 
activities. Despite the benefits that behavior control affords the firm (Anderson and Oliver 1987), 
it can also significantly compromise the positive effect of top performer rewards on perceived 
top performer customer relationship building competence, especially when overall organizational 
justice is perceived as low. When overall organizational justice is low and behavior control is 
employed, top performer rewards are more likely to be linked to perceived favoritism resulting in 
salesperson opportunism. Such a pattern is also observed in large sales units. Importantly, 
although perceived favoritism may have not actually occurred, erroneous attributions are often 
made and salespeople will act in accordance with their inferences (Teas and McElroy 1986). 
Therefore, an overall justice perception in the sales organization is critical if top performer 
rewards are expected to motivate fellow salespeople to improve their selling skills, especially 
when behavior control is employed in a large sales unit. Firms must carefully assess whether 
their sales environment is optimally suited to leverage the intended positive implications of top 
performer rewards among the sales staff.   
Limitations and future research directions 
This study is subject to some limitations. First, level-one data may be affected by 
common method bias as they came from the single source–the salesperson. Although post hoc 
analysis suggests that this is not likely a serious threat, future research can collect multisource or 
longitudinal level-one data for more definitive causal inferences. Second, our empirical context 
is the consumer division of financial investment firms. The extent to which our findings would 
apply in other sales settings (e.g., B2B product-based sales) cannot be assumed without further 
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testing. Third, we collected data in Taiwan (a collectivist culture), which may have bolstered 
some of the proposed relationships in the model. Whether results are generalizable to more 
individualist cultural contexts remain to be seen. 
Our research also points to directions for future research endeavors. First, we 
conceptualized behavior control based on Anderson and Oliver’s (1987) seminal work by 
treating it as a global construct. A more refined concept of behavior control includes two 
qualitatively distinct constructs–activity control and capability control (Challagalla and Shervani 
1996). While activity control specifies a set of activities and courses of action salespeople have 
to perform during the selling process, capability control allows for more flexibility by focusing 
on improving the salesperson’s ability to effectively adapt to different customer encounters and 
situations (Miao and Evans 2013). Because we operationalized behavior control in line with 
activity control, the extent to which capability control can strengthen the link between top 
performer rewards and perceived top performer customer relationship building competence 
remains to be seen.  
Second, we did not consider the top performer’s characteristics in the model. For 
example, it is likely that the top performer has superior political skills (e.g., interpersonal 
influence, social astuteness), which enable the top salesperson to establish relational centrality 
and positional centrality (Bolander et al. 2015).  Research has suggested that network ties can 
moderate fairness judgment (Arnold et al. 2009). Will these top performer-related network 
characteristics matter? How will they moderate fellow salesperson’s perceptions? 
Third, we examined overall organizational justice as a critical boundary condition in our 
model. Although overall justice provides a heuristic for salespeople to make attributional 
inferences, it is the sales manager that plays a proximal role in the daily interaction with and 
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management of salespeople. It would be interesting to compare the relative impact of the sales 
manager’s influence (e.g., trustworthiness) versus the organization-level characteristics (e.g., 
justice) especially when they differ. For example, when the sales manager is trustworthy yet the 
overall organization justice is considered to be low, how will the effect of top performer rewards 
differ relative to another scenario where the sales manager is not trustworthy yet the overall 
organizational justice is high? These important questions can only be answered by future 
research. 
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M SD AVEa 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Top performer rewards 5.54 .99 .62 .76
2. Top performer customer relationship building competence 5.85 .82 .52 .46** .83
3. Favoritism 4.19 1.48 .83 .08 -.17* .93
4. Salesperson selling skills 5.00 1.01 .79 .22** .21** .01 .92
5. Salesperson opportunism 4.12 1.18 .52 -.12 -.10 .24** -.01 .83
6. Salesperson rewards 4.41 .99 .77 .28** .22** .06 .56** -.10 .86
7. Organizational justice 4.60 1.11 .50 .27** .23** -.21** .25** -.43** .37** .73
8. Behavior control 4.87 1.05 .59 .13 .07 -.03 -.06 .16* .02 -.13 .71
9. Sales unit size 10.9 12.9 - .02 .09 .06 -.02 -.01 .06 -.06 .00 -
10. Salesperson experience 6.95 4.80 - .01 -.04 .04 .18** -.04 .19** .08 -.14* .06 -
11. Salesperson age 35.33 7.47 - .02 .02 -.00 .04 -.10 .05 .05 -.12 .01 .57** -
12. Salesperson performance 4.60 1.34 .80 .12 .08 .07 .21** -.05 .34** .07 .10 .01 .01 .03 .92
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
aAVEs of salespeople-reported constructs are CMV-adjusted 
Cronbach's alphas appear on the diagonal.
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of study variables 
TABLE 1
2 
 
 
Model 1: Baseline model 
(main effects only)
Model 2: Hypothesized 
(interactive effects)
Model 3: Best fitting 
model
Top performer rewards                  top performer customer relationship building competence .40** .42** .42**
Organizational justice                      top performer customer relationship building competence .05 .01 .01
Salesperson rewards                    top performer customer relationship building competence .14* .14* .14*
Salesperson age                 top performer customer relationship building competence .08 .05 .05
Salesperson experience                   top performer customer relationship building competence -.12* -.10* -.10*
Top performer rewards                       favoritism .14 .07 .06
Organizational justice                      favoritism -.16* -.12* -.10
Salesperson rewards                     favoritism -.001 .07 .06
Salesperson age                 favoritism -.14* -.10 -.09
Salesperson experience                   favoritism .10 .07 .07
Top performer customer relationship building competence                    salesperson selling skills .27** .23** .24**
Salesperson age                 salesperson selling skills -.11* -.13* -.13*
Salesperson experience                    salesperson selling skills .22** .22** .22**
Favoritism                   salesperson opportunism .29** .28** .23*
Salesperson age                 salesperson opportunism -.10 -.10 -.10
Salesperson experience                   salesperson opportunism -.03 -.03 .04
Salesperson selling skills                     salesperson performance .22** .22** .22**
Salesperson age                salesperson performance -.02 -.02 -.02
Salesperson experience                    salesperson performance -.02 -.02 -.02
Behavior control                   top performer customer relationship building competence .01 -.003 -.003
Behavior control                  favoritism -.10 -.12 -.08
Behavior control                   salesperson selling skills -.08 -.08 -.08
Sales unit size                   top performer customer relationship building competence .09* .06 .06
Sales unit size                  favoritism .05 .12** .13**
Table 2. Model comparison and resultsa
Path
3 
 
 
 
Top performer rewards X behavior control                 top performer customer relationship building competence - -.17* -.17*
Organizational justice x behavior control                top performer customer relationship building competence - .10 .10
Top performer rewards X organizational justice                top performer customer relationship building competence - .03 .04
Top performer rewards X behavior control                favoritism - .01 .01
Organizational justice X behavior control                 favoritism - -.03 -.02
Top performer rewards X organizational justice                favoritism - -.22** -.22*
Top performer rewards X sales unit size                 top performer customer relationship building competence - .04 .05
Organizational justice x sales unit size                top performer customer relationship building competence - -.07 -.08
Top performer rewards X sales unit size                favoritism - -.08 -.09
Organizational justice X sales unit size                 favoritism - .08 .09
-
.09* .09*
Top performer rewards X organizational justice x behavior control                       favoritism - -.14* -.15*
-
.05 .05
Top performer rewards X organizational justice x sales unit size                    favoritism - -.14** -.14**
- -.12* -.12*
Behavior control                  salesperson opportunism - - .10*
Sales unit size                   salesperson selling skills - - -.06*
Organizational justice                salesperson opportunism - - -.35**
Log-likelihood  -1438.261 -1420.237 -1403.244
Chi-square difference (Δd.f.) - 48.65(22)** 38.58(7)**
d.f. 41 63 70
N 212 212 212
Clusters 71 71 71
* p < .05; ** p < .01
aUnstandardized path coefficients
Table 2 Continued
Top performer rewards X organizational justice x behavior control                  top performer customer relationship 
building competence
Top performer rewards X organizational justice x sales unit size                  top performer customer relationship           
building competence
Top performer customer relationship building competence X behavior control                 salesperson selling skills
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Interactive effects of organizational justice, top performer rewards, and behavior control on 
perceived top performer customer relationship building competence
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B. Interactive effects of organizational justice, top performer rewards, and behavior control on 
perceived top performer favoritism
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C. Interactive effects of organizational justice, top performer rewards, and sales unit size on perceived 
top performer favoritism
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